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1 Background and objectives: Why we need a technology-
based treaty as a supplement to a cap-and-trade treaty 
The urgency of formulating climate policies for the period after 2012 is highlighted by the 
fact that we probably already have exceeded the level at which we need to stabilize the 
greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere if we want to be reasonably sure that we can 
keep the increase in global mean temperature under 2 degrees Celsius in the future – the 
official goal of EU and Norway in climate policy.  
Using standard (and probably conservative) assumptions about the climate sensitivity1, it is 
likely that we will have to reduce global emissions between 50 and 80 per cent compared to 
today’s level by the middle of the century, with further reductions thereafter. Any fair burden 
sharing of, say, a conservative requirement of 50 per cent reduction then indicates that 
emission levels in the rich countries will have to be reduced by about 80 per cent, while the 
poor countries will have to reduce their emissions by 5 to 10 per cent2
At the international level, coordination of such support can be attained through a technology 
(RD&D) treaty for a ‘coalition of the willing’, incorporating a long time horizon (perhaps 15-
20 years). Financing and other measures included in the treaty should be verifiable, and a 
system with a central ‘research council’ might be preferable. Each party to the treaty should 
be assured to get a proportional share of the resources in the form of research contracts, 
testing facilities, etc., but the teams carrying out the research and development should be 
international in scope, securing access to knowledge and technology transfer between the 
parties to the treaty. The technology treaty should thus secure substantial long-term public 
funding for research, development and testing of key technologies in accordance with the 
preferences and comparative advantages of each participating country. Taken together, we 
.  
The requirement of around 80 per cent reduction in emissions from the rich part of the world 
sends a strong signal that the 2 degree target really implies a near zero emission vision of 
future societal development. In other words, we are going to try to eliminate all emissions of 
greenhouse gases that can reasonably be expected to be removed. This means that we will 
have to learn to produce steel, aluminium and all other basic materials without emissions of 
greenhouse gases. Furthermore, we will have to learn to transport ourselves, on land, on sea 
and in the air, without emissions. All power and heating requirements will have to be fulfilled 
without emissions. This clearly calls for new ways of doing things; that is, we must develop 
and implement new technologies.  While market-based instruments like greenhouse gas taxes 
and cap-and-trade systems are efficient tools for securing the implementation of new 
technologies, they fall short when it comes to giving incentives for technology research, 
development and demonstration (RD&D).  
We argue that an important part of the solution to this problem is to recognize that public 
funds will have to carry a substantial part of the research and development costs of new 
climate friendly technologies. This is because promises of future rewards to private investors 
in technology development and demonstration are not in themselves entirely convincing, in 
particular when governments more or less directly control the rewards. Thus, government 
support, in the form of direct subsidies to (RD&D) and other means such as setting standards 
and goals for the future, are necessary supplements to a cap-and-trade regime (Alfsen and 
Eskeland, 2007). 
                                                     
1 Climate sensitivity is defined as how much the equilibrium temperature would change if greenhouse 
gas concentrations were allowed to double over pre-industrial levels. The standard (and likely 
conservative) estimate is 3 degrees Celsius. 
2 These numbers refer to equal per capita emission allowances, not taking future population growth into 
account. Other reasonable burden-sharing rules give similar numbers.  
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2 
believe such a RD&D based treaty should have a fair chance of being self-enforcing and also 
be attractive to nations outside the core industrialised countries. This is because RD&D 
cooperation will attract participants interested in (a) energy security and climate benefits; (b) 
sharing in research contracts and technology cooperation, and (c) increased competitiveness 
and trade access.  
We would like to underline that greater emphasis on RD&D efforts is in no way a substitute 
to supporting emission reductions through cap-and-trade or emission taxes. Rather, the two 
approaches are logically complementary and mutually supportive.  A problem for a cap-and-
trade system alone is to rally broad participation in emission limits (or high mitigation 
rewards). This is a problem that is addressed by an RD&D program through its promise to 
bring down future mitigation costs. Likewise, a problem for a stand-alone RD&D program is 
to stimulate the implementation of already existing climate friendly technologies, which is 
exactly what a cap-and-trade program can provide. Since this weakness of a stand-alone 
RD&D programs also jeopardizes its effectiveness in providing future technologies, the 
complementarities between RD&D and cap-and-trade are fundamental. 
Ideas along these lines need to be explored in more detail, and more concrete examples and 
suggestions for a technology-based climate treaty should be developed. This policy note is 
meant to be a modest contribution in this direction.  
The policy note is organised as follows. First we very briefly go through some aspects of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) related to technology 
development and diffusion (section 2). In the following section (section 3), a number of 
technology-related international efforts are listed, before we go on to discuss in section 4 
cases of international cooperation involving technology development outside the climate or 
energy area. Section 5 discusses ways to organize an international effort to develop climate 
friendly technologies, while section 6 outlines a possible technology treaty. We end in section 
7 with suggestions for the way forward in this important work. 
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Box 1: Non-global participation in mitigation weakens the case for cost effectiveness 
 
When economists study cooperation in providing a public good (like emission reductions), the 
challenge is to prevent ‘free-riding’. In the case of greenhouse gas emission reductions – the supply 
of a global public good – free-riding means letting others undertake the emission reductions.  
 
Economists often propose studying cooperation through ‘repeated games’, in which free-riding is 
prevented because future gains from cooperation are more tempting to a player than are the 
immediate gains from not cooperating. If the discount rate is low so that the future matters a lot, 
high levels of cooperation can be attained. The theory is often difficult to apply in practice, 
however. Most importantly, the theory presumes that cooperation is sustained by threats. But a 
threat that free-riding will be met by non-cooperation forever may not be credible.  
 
For greenhouse gas emission reductions, there have been strategies announced which use, to some 
extent, the insights from repeated games. First, the US position, adopted in the Senate before the 
Kyoto negotiations, was ‘we’ll not reduce emissions unless other big countries do’, with a clear 
address to India and China. Second, Europe has recently said ‘by 2020, we’ll reduce emissions by 
20%, or by 30% if others contribute’, with clear address to the United States.  
 
It is not, however, clear that these US and EU strategies reflect the true nature of the ‘games 
nations play’. These perspectives do not, for instance, give any support for an idea of ‘leadership’ 
in which an agent contributes to a public good without conditions, hoping that others will follow. 
Could the theory miss something important? Sweden is a country that has decided to unilaterally 
reduce emissions by more than its international obligations. The country has also decided to 
undertake all these reductions ‘at home’, against the advice of many economists. Economists 
would prescribe emission reductions to be bought abroad if they are cheaper. But the economists 
have no perspective on leadership in the logic behind this advice. Could it be that  leadership is not 
a flawed idea, but that it requires ‘action at home’? 
 
There are some simple ways in which ‘taking a lead’ can cause others to follow (Alfsen and 
Eskeland, 2007). Perhaps tellingly, these ways do question whether the cost effectiveness criterion 
– through emission trading – should be given prominence. First, if a country invests in climate 
friendly technology development, it makes emission reductions cheaper for others. This kind of 
leadership can thus generate followers, without relying on the threats in repeated games. Second, if 
a rich country reduces its own emissions with surprising effectiveness, it can generate followers by 
example. Third, social norms may support following suit when some provide public goods 
voluntarily.  
 
In a world of non-global participation in mitigation treaties, the question of how ‘a coalition of the 
willing’ can generate ‘followers’ and expand is different from how ‘leaders’ can cut cost 
effectively. Cost effectiveness in what is done by the coalition is likely important, but 
technological development and leadership by example and illustration will likely be important, too. 
Thus, as compared to a world with global participation, and as compared to a world with no 
learning, the cost effectiveness criterion is weakened.  
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Box 2:  Is cooperation on technology easier to sustain? 
 
An important argument behind technology efforts is that a climate regime in terms of ‘cap and 
trade’ will fail to provide sufficient incentives for long-term investments in future emission 
reductions. The lack of incentives are related to the fact that (i) expected prices (for emission free 
cars, for instance), not actual prices, motivate investors; and (ii) expected sales worldwide – of 
emission free cars – represent the global benefits of innovation, whereas the investor may expect 
failing interests from some countries.  
 
A part of the ‘lacking incentives’ can be envisaged as follows. Say Sweden, or a Swedish 
company, invests in emission-free cars. Other countries that do not invest in the technology could 
get those cars cheaply when the Swedes have succeeded, by failing to provide a tough regime for 
emissions from cars domestically. A country with a weak regime on emissions from cars would 
give Swedish cars a price high enough to sell in that country, but a margin too thin to reward 
Swedish investors for their investments.  
 
One way for Sweden or Swedish investors to avoid this risk would be to invest with others in a 
way that locks both to the same faith.  As when nations invest together in military technology (‘I 
do the wings, you do the wheels’), a nation cannot gain from backing out without harming itself. 
Thus, the technique solves a problem of dependence and thus vulnerability by creating co-
dependence. It is a way of addressing a ‘hold-up problem’ (Hart and More). Montgomery and 
Smith (2004) pointed out that technology investments to solve the climate problem may be 
vulnerable to the hold-up problem, implying that expected emission prices will be low, and so 
will be technology investments.  
 
At a greater scale too, and in other ways, nations can through coordination make technology 
investments attractive at higher levels (and at longer time perspectives). One way is by matching 
investments not in one technology but in terms of policy that includes a trade perspective. What, 
for instance, if the European countries agree with the United States that the Europe develops 
emission-free electric power plant technology and the United States develops emission-free cars. 
This would give investing countries on both sides of the Atlantic some assurance. The 
noncooperative act that Europeans could fear from the United States would be US policies that 
are tougher on car emissions than on power plant emissions. Thereby, US government would 
keep its ‘promises’ to US investors but fail to honour promises to European ones. The matching 
investments would make such opportunistic government behaviour less attractive to the United 
States because then its cars would face similar unfavourable policies and low profits in Europe. 
Because of this co-dependence, each party can invest more and with greater confidence.  
 
Finally, take the concern that developing countries would have that development of new 
technology in rich countries will raise barriers for their industrial success. And consider the 
concern that US investors in car technology would be given slim profits, if any at all, in emerging 
economies’ climate policies. If a large emerging economy is part of the power plant technology 
investment consortium, so that its workers learn and its turbine factories grow, confidence on 
both sides will be stronger, and r&d investments can be higher and more successful. 
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2 Climate technologies and the UNFCCC 
 
Technology issues directly related to climate change are found in several Articles of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Most of them address transfer of 
technology, but development of technology is also included, for instance in Article 4.1(c): 
[All Parties, …, shall:] “Promote and cooperate in the development, application and diffusion, 
including transfer, of technologies, practices and process that control, reduce or prevent 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases…”  
Transfer of technology is mentioned in several Articles, with Article 4.5 as perhaps the most 
important: “The developed country Parties … shall take all practicable steps to promote, 
facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound 
technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to 
enable them to implement the provisions of the Convention.” 
Technology development has been very little discussed under the UNFCCC. Transfer of 
technology has, however, been a contentious issue in the climate change negotiation process, 
where developing countries claim that the developed countries have not implemented their 
commitments in the Convention in this area. Without taking a stand on what is right or wrong, 
there is clearly a large gap between developing countries’ expectations and what developed 
countries have delivered.  
In order to advance and facilitate the implementation of Article 4.5, an Expert Group on 
Technology Transfer (EGTT), with a total of 19 members, was established in 2001. Important 
work has been undertaken, for instance by facilitating development of technology needs 
assessments by developing countries. During the last years, discussions about Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPRs) and a proposal to develop a fund to buy IPRs have been in focus, as 
have also proposals to give EGTT a higher “status”. At COP 13 in Bali, it was decided that 
EGTT should continue its work, with particular regard to the need for adequate and timely 
support and development of performance indicators for monitoring and evaluating indicators 
for technology transfer. An increased awareness among developed countries about the 
importance of transfer of technology may help to advance the work, but due to the very high 
expectations in this area, one may expect difficult work ahead. 
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3 Ongoing initiatives for development of climate friendly 
technology 
 
Various international cooperative initiatives related to development and deployment of 
climate friendly technologies exist, and could possibly form a basis for a strengthened 
technology component in or connected to a future climate change regime. Some of the 
existing cooperative arrangements are briefly described below. 
3.1  IEA Technology Collaboration 
To support work on its core issues, the International Energy Agency (IEA) has created a legal 
contract (Implementing Agreement) and a system of standard rules and regulations that allow 
interested member and non-member governments to pool resources for collaboration on 
research, development and deployment of particular technologies (www.iea.org). The 
collaboration must fit into the IEA shared goals: energy security, environmental protection, 
and economic growth. In 2007, there were 41 collaborative projects working, with several 
thousand participants from 72 countries, organisations and companies. Several of the 
Implementing Agreements are of direct relevance to climate change mitigation. Examples are 
Advanced Fuel Cells, Climate Technology Initiative (CTI), Efficient Electrical End-use 
Equipment, Greenhouse Gas RD Programme, Renewable Energy Technology Development, 
Photovoltaic Power Systems, and Wind Energy Systems. 
The collaboration can be financed on a cost-shared or task-shared basis, as long as the 
signatories agree and follow the guidelines as set out in the Implementing Agreement. Some 
use common funds to cover the costs of central administration; others rely entirely on task-
sharing to reduce administrative costs. 
The IEA Secretariat provides legal advice and support to the technology collaboration and 
report on activities through its various publications. Every five years, the IEA Committee on 
Energy Research and Technology reviews the effectiveness, achievements and strategy of 
each Implementing Agreement. 
3.2  CSLF – Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum 
The CSLF is an international climate change initiative focused on development of cost-
effective technologies for the separation and capture of CO2 for its transport and safe storage, 
and to make such technologies broadly available (www.cslforum.org). CSLF was initiated by 
the United States, and the CSLF charter was signed in 2005. Membership is open to national 
governmental entities, and it has 22 members. Both developed and developing countries 
participate in the partnership. The charter will stay in effect for 10 years. 
A Policy Group, with representatives of all members, govern the overall framework and 
policies of the CSLF. Decisions are taken by consensus. A Technical Group, reporting to the 
Policy Group, review the progress of collaborative projects. Secretariat services are provided 
by the US Department of Energy, which may also use services of personnel employed by 
members. 
The basic funding rule is that any costs arising from CSLF activities will be borne by the 
Member that incurs them. 
Another US led partnership of relevance to climate change is the Methane to Markets 
Partnership (www.methanetomarkets.org). This has so far focused more on deployment of 
existing technologies than on development of new technologies. 
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3.3  Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development & Climate – APP  
Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, Korea, and the United States participate in this 
partnership, initiated by the United States in 2005 (www.asiapacificpartnership.org). Its 
objective is to address energy needs and associated issues of air pollution, energy security, 
and climate change. The intention is inter alia to accelerate development and deployment of 
cleaner and more effective technologies. 
A Policy and Implementation Committee (PIC) has been established to oversee APP as a 
whole and guide eight Task Forces that deal with issues identified in eight sectoral areas: 
Aluminium, buildings, cement, cleaner fossil energy, coal mining, power generation and 
transmission, renewable energy and distributed generation, and steel. An Administrative 
Support Group, currently hosted by the United States, provides support to the PIC and 
undertakes other secretariat functions. 
3.4  The World Bank Funds 
The World Bank is working on the establishment of a Clean Technology Trust Fund as one of 
a portfolio of strategic Climate Investment Trust Funds. This is an initiative to govern and 
coordinate significant pledges from Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States on 
climate change. The idea is to have separate funds to address forest/deforestation issues and 
adaptation, in addition to technology. 
The objective of the Clean Technology Trust Fund is to provide scaled-up financing to assist 
developing countries transforming to low carbon economies. The Fund would provide 
concessional financing to facilitate deployment of low carbon technologies. It is not yet 
decided to what extent this fund will focus on proven technologies only, or whether 
“unproven” technologies will also be covered. 
3.5  EU research programmes 
The EU undertakes significant research programmes, which are open for participation also for 
organisations and researchers based outside Europe. The Research programme includes 
several activities that are focused on technologies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
This includes carbon capture and storage, various projects on renewable energy, hydrogen 
and fuel cells, and technologies for improved energy efficiency. 
CICERO Policy Note 2008:01 
 Elements for an Agreement on Climate and Energy Technology Development (ACT!) 
 
 
 
 
8 
4 Other global challenges  
4.1  Food security - CGIAR 
The world has been confronted with other global challenges before, for instance in relation to 
population growth and food security in the 1970´s. The international response at that time was 
creation of CGIAR – The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, 
established in 1971. This way of reacting may provide a model or useful elements for the 
climate change challenge. The following description is taken from their web-page 
(http://www.cgiar.org).  
CGIAR is a strategic partnership open to all countries and organizations that share a 
commitment to achieving sustainable agricultural development and are willing to invest 
financial, human and technical resources toward this end. Its 64 Members support, through 
member fees and sometimes more restricted contributions, 15 international Centres, working 
in collaboration with many hundreds of government and civil society organizations as well as 
private businesses around the world. CGIAR Members include 21 developing and 26 
industrialized countries, four co-sponsors as well as 13 other international organizations. 
Today, more than 8,000 CGIAR scientists and staff are active in over 100 countries 
throughout the world. CGIAR expenditures amounted to US$506 million in 2007. 
The CGIAR generates cutting-edge science to foster sustainable agricultural growth that 
benefits the poor through stronger food security, better human nutrition and health, higher 
incomes and improved management of natural resources. The new crop varieties, knowledge 
and other products resulting from the CGIAR’s collaborative research are made widely 
available to individuals and organizations working for sustainable agricultural development 
throughout the world.  
In addition, the CGIAR implements several innovative “Challenge Program” designed to 
confront global or regional issues of vital importance. Implemented through broad-based 
research partnerships, Challenge Programs mobilize knowledge, technology and resources to 
solve those and other problems such as micronutrient deficiencies, water scarcity, and climate 
change.  
The primary institutions in the System are: 
• the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR/the 
Group);  
• an independent Science Council; and  
• fifteen international agricultural research Centres.  
The three components of the CGIAR System are interdependent. They are supported by the 
Executive Council (ExCo) of the System, a broad range of partners, various standing 
committees, and the System Office, a "virtual" combination of service units.  
The "Charter of the CGIAR System" sets down the roles, responsibilities and functions of the 
main organs of the CGIAR, including eligibility for Membership in the Group and conditions 
of Membership. The Annex to the Charter contains the Rules of Procedure of the main 
organs, which includes rules on the need for consensus to reach decisions.  
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4.2  Vaccines 
Another global challenge is the development of medicines, and vaccines in particular, for the 
poor part of the world where the need is high, but ability to pay for development and 
production of the pharmaceuticals low. This situation is similar to the one involving use of 
climate friendly technologies in the poor countries. In case of the pharmaceuticals, an option 
that has been tried is for the governments of the rich world to commit to buying a certain 
amount of e.g. malaria vaccines at a given price, thus securing an incentive for private 
development of such vaccines.  
While it is possible to view the ‘vaccines’ efforts and other pharmaceutical development 
efforts as gifts to the poor world, it is also possible to view them simply as public goods, or 
the diseases as ‘public bads’. (See Barrett, 2007, for instance, on public goods that are 
‘weakest link’ problems, etc.). If it is the case, for instance, that disease prevention is most 
critically dependent on the ‘weakest link’, then all countries would in self-interest spend 
resources to support preventive efforts in the country which is the weakest link.   
4.3  Nuclear power, gas turbines and weapons 
In other cases the technology developments have been driven mainly by military needs. 
Besides basic weapons research, examples are gas turbines (used in the development of jet 
fighters) and nuclear power. Here, the governments have usually been the controlling agent 
from inception to finalisation of the products. International cooperation occurs among allies. 
The usual mode of operation has been to subcontract components of the final system, whether 
a weapon system or a reactor of fusion or fission type. This creates mutual dependency 
among the participating parties, encouraging a self-enforcing type of cooperation. 
4.4  Summarizing the examples 
The three examples given above (agriculture, pharmaceuticals or nuclear power/weapons) 
have some interesting features distinguishing them from each other.  
In the case of CGIAR the actual research, development and demonstration is distributed 
among public research centres in both rich and poor countries with a common service centre 
and a common science committee providing services and guidance to the individual centres. 
Intellectual property rights to discoveries and technologies developed seems to reside in the 
individual centres (details may be worth pursuing).  
When government seeks to give incentives to pharmaceutical development by promising to 
buy the final products at fixed prices, the actual development will take place in different 
entities, including private firms, presumably mainly in the rich part of the world. The 
guaranteed amount is paid for by the rich countries. The product will then be sold at a lower 
price in the developing world. A way to look at this is that it represents a gift from the rich to 
the poor world. Another way is that one relieves a costly constraint when allowing the fixed 
costs of discovery (a public good, in fact) to be financed in ways other than by charging users 
on a per unit basis. In this perspective, it is a two-part tariff, and it is a form of price 
discrimination that is economically efficient3
                                                     
3 In textbook economic terms, the following constraints are costly – efficiency wise – under economies 
of scale (as with discovery): (i) only per unit charges provide resources to producers; (ii) per unit 
charges are constant and uniform across users or markets. Removal of the first is often seen in 
industries with scale economy – like roads and utilities – when these get a subsidy from the state. The 
latter is also seen in those contexts, but also in other contexts when the market allows price 
discrimination. In the case of pharmaceuticals (and some other markets), price discrimination by 
country of sale is facilitated by preventing resale, by trade restrictions, etc. For personalized items such 
as air tickets, school admissions and hotel rooms, price discrimination is standard fare, even in 
unregulated markets, without government facilitation.   
.  This other view is supported, of course, by the 
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quite general observation that many countries use public resources to fund (or subsidize) 
medical research. 
The last type of model, regarding weapons and nuclear power, represents mainly cooperation 
among rich countries and for rich countries. Both in weapons development and in other 
defence cooperation (alliances, for instance), modes of cooperation have features of interest. 
One special feature is that in defence, the cooperative gains may be such as to attain the 
desired results (peace, freedom) at lower overall levels of spending. For climate technology, 
while there may exist such gains to cooperation itself (like from sharing of results), the more 
important gains likely arise from raising overall investment levels (I’ll spend more if you 
spend more). Another is that in defence cooperation, like in CGIAR, individual countries do 
what they can do best. In agriculture, rice research is in Manila, potatoes in Peru. In NATO, 
Norway plays an important role in the North East Atlantic, while wealthy countries like UK 
and the United States can move forces to any corner of the alliance’s sphere. Cooperation, 
then, basically credits and supports each type of effort, making it more meaningful on its own, 
and making sure the outputs are shared. A third is that – due to the ‘distributed efforts’ in 
defence cooperation – energy must be put into assuring that that no-one pulls out, shirks, or 
refuses to share when an effort is successful or necessary. Joint development (you do the 
wings, I do the wheels) is one such mechanism. Barter trade (you’ll buy my bombers, 
equipped with your missiles) is another.  
The summary can be illustrated as in the table below. 
 Where is R & D taking 
place? 
Where are resources 
coming from? 
Where is the   
technology 
implemented? 
 
CGIAR  
 
Rich + poor 
 
Rich 
 
Rich + poor 
Pharma Rich (private) Rich Poor 
Weapons/Nuclear Rich (government + 
private) 
Rich Rich 
 
What type of approach would work best in the case of developing climate friendly 
technologies? Given that an important consideration is how to allow developing countries to 
grow without increasing their greenhouse gas emissions, implementation must certainly be as 
broad as possible4
Quite likely, for development of future energy- and climate friendly technology, several 
arguments are valid for specific and close ‘North-South’ partnerships, for instance linking 
Detroit and MIT’s Boston-Cambridge with Sao Paulo. We may call them EE partnerships, for 
Emerging and Established. On the ‘industrial side’ a ‘Northern’ (or established) centre of 
builders and academics that are working well together is obvious. Equally obvious are 
. There are also strong arguments related to development needs for 
establishing a fair part of the needed technology centres in the developing world. Thus, 
CGIAR model seems to lend important features to a climate technology agreement.   
On the other hand, quite possibly, for rice research, the case for placing it in the Philippines, 
basically adding rich country funding for researchers, and a global network, likely is stronger 
than it is for, say – solar technology or low-carbon cars.  For the latter, it may be more 
essential to work closely with modern manufacturing enterprises, perhaps also in places such 
as the San Francisco Bay area, the Boston Cambridge area, Stuttgart, Toyota or Detroit.  
                                                     
4 Stern (2008) emphasizes as a prerequisite for global participation (in emission ceilings) ’proof that 
low-carbon development is feasible.  
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arguments from the funding side and in incentives: an established industrialized country is 
more willing to invest in new technology if it is channelled through and boosts returns to its 
present manufacturing and human capital. The industrial side arguments for closely 
integrating ‘Southern’ (or emerging) centres are equally strong: future manufacturing 
capacity, future car sales, and so on will be growing faster in emerging economies than in 
established ones. Incentives for such links are also strong both in the established and in the 
emerging economies. Economic and financial returns will be higher to all if products can be 
sold in both places, and joint investments will represent commitments to the policies allowing 
such markets to develop.  
There are also deeper and more indirect reasons to build new research initiatives (which could 
be centres, or twin centres, in a physical sense) through integrated efforts involving both 
established and emerging economies.  From the point of view of emerging economies (which 
on their own may have little interest and resources (financial and knowledge) for individual 
RD&D efforts, an effort including only by the established economies can easily appear non-
inclusive. It will therefore risk not earning global support. RD&D invested with and in 
emerging centres of academics and manufacturers will represent a credible commitment to 
ensure inclusiveness and ‘Southern’ access to the gains.  
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5 How to organise an international effort 
An agreement on development of climate friendly technologies should fulfil certain criteria, 
such as 
• being open to all countries;  
• having a long term perspective;  
• being connected to the UNFCCC; and  
• taking into account the special circumstances of developing countries.  
None of the ongoing activities discussed above fulfil all these criteria, although the possible 
new World Bank funds may be an opportunity that could be used. However, there would be 
many advantages in establishing a separate agreement, but at the same time avoid duplication 
and seek cooperation with ongoing activities. Work under the UNFCCC, for instance as 
expressed through the “Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change 
by enhancing implementation of the Convention” (FCCC/CP/2007/4), clearly calls for 
increased efforts related to deployment and development of technology. That is an indication 
that existing initiatives are not considered sufficient, and that strengthened efforts are needed. 
An improved framework for strengthened international cooperation on developing climate 
friendly technology should in principle be open for broad participation from all countries that 
are interested in contributing. Requirements for input from participants to the cooperation 
should take this into account. Furthermore, it should address a broad range of technologies, 
but subject to priorities based on e.g. resources available. 
Strengthened international cooperation on technology development and demonstration will 
have to be based on some sort of a binding agreement: a protocol or a charter. A very relevant 
option might be to develop a framework or “umbrella” agreement that specifies the general 
obligations of the members, and to supplement the framework agreement with additional 
agreements with different subsets of members for specific projects and/or technologies, see 
Figure 1. Examples of such additional agreements may be carbon capture and storage (CCS), 
renewable energies (which may even be split further in one agreement on wind, one on solar, 
etc.), and energy-efficient appliances. A system with a framework agreement and multiple 
specific agreements would have some similarity to IEA’s use of Implementing Agreements. It 
would also have similarities with defence cooperation in an alliance, where separate sub-
agreements are formed for purposes such as developing a new weapons system, intervening in 
a given area/situation, joint exercises, education, etc.  
It may be realistic to assume that the best way to initiate work would be to start with one 
agreement with a limited number of participants, e.g. the Nordic countries in an initial phase. 
This agreement might take one or two shapes. One possibility is that this agreement is meant 
to be one of the future ‘sub-agreements’, supported by a global supra-treaty on RD&D. The 
supra-treaty might very well start as a general formulation in Copenhagen in support of 
RD&D collaboration. In this case, the Nordic agreement starts work on a favoured field (low-
energy buildings, say), while calling for a supra-treaty under which it would like to fit. 
Another possibility is that the Nordic agreement is intended to morph – via enlarged 
participation – into the global supra-treaty. Then, in formulating the agreement one should 
take into account that it may later be desirable to add on separate agreements for specific 
projects. 
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Figure 1. Possible structure of the development of a technology based treaty. 
A very simplified illustration of how the cooperation might function is that resources flow 
into the agreement from member countries, and the resources are then redistributed to agreed 
projects which are open for research proposals from organisations, companies, consortia and 
individuals in the member countries. This would be equivalent to how a research council 
normally functions. 
Alternatively, one might base the cooperation on task-sharing, where member countries come 
with national projects and seek cooperation with similar or complementary projects in other 
countries. This would have the advantage that members are certain that they will be directly 
involved in projects, and do not run the risk of providing money to the international effort 
without getting an equivalent amount back as funding to their national research entities. To 
many, this mode of operation may also serve as assurance against bureaucracy and unpleasant 
aspects of politics.  
To what extent members should be guaranteed project funding or the organisation should 
distribute the money to the best qualified is likely to be a sensitive issue. First priority for 
rewarding project applications should be quality. But at the same time it is important to bear 
in mind political realities: It is likely to be more difficult for a government to agree to 
significant funding without a reassurance of a return. One may therefore have to include for 
instance a clause saying that over a given time period (10-15 years?) a member country may 
expect to get project funding equivalent to x % of their input, where x might be 50 for an 
industrialized country. 
An advantage of the cost-sharing model is that it would be more effective in getting the best-
qualified project participants and thereby achieving good results. It may also provide better 
opportunities for participants from developing countries to get engaged in and obtaining 
funding for specific projects. 
The organization will in both cases need a competent body that can define, prioritise, and 
select areas for research and development. For the cost-sharing model the organisation would 
need a “machinery” to evaluate applications and develop recommendations for funding. Most 
likely, the agreement will allow for both forms. A jointly funded research organization could 
pursue priority projects with a global perspective. The agreement that establishes it also 
provides for agreements in which countries (and companies?) cooperate more directly. Such 
cooperative agreements – say between the Nordic countries on efficient buildings – would 
need to satisfy certain requirements to be ‘credited’ in the global agreement. These 
requirements would probably be Southern participation, as well as more general provisions 
for sharing and access and suitability.  A sketch of such a structure is given in Box 3.  
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6 Structure of a Agreement on Climate and Energy 
Technology Development (ACT!) 
 
The framework agreement would need the following Articles: 
Objective: To facilitate increased efforts as well as international cooperation on development 
and demonstration of technologies that may contribute to reductions of emissions of 
greenhouse gases in support of efforts to reach the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC. 
 
Membership: All Parties to the UNFCCC may become members of this agreement. After 
entry into force, any Party to the UNFCCC may apply for membership. Membership shall be 
decided by the Steering Committee by consensus, and shall become effective immediately 
after the decision by the Steering Committee. The Steering Committee may decide on 
whether and how membership of and participation by entities other than countries 
(corporations) is appropriate. 
 
Organization
1. All members may participate in a Steering Committee/Policy Committee to oversee 
the overall implementation of the agreement, decide on project funding, and assess 
annual reports from the Technical Committee/Implementation Committees. Decisions 
of the Committee are by consensus or by other rules to be established (one might take 
account of countries share in the interest (population size) or in contributions etc.  
:  
2. Alternative A, one agreement: A Technology Committee is established to evaluate 
proposals received, assess progress of projects, etc. The Technical Committee report 
annually to the Steering Committee/Policy Committee. Decisions are by consensus or 
other rules to be established (may differ for different decisions). May be open for all 
members or only a sub-group of members?  
Alternative B, a framework agreement and separate agreement for various 
technologies/challenges/purposes: An Implementation Committee is established for 
each supplementary agreement, consisting of representatives from members to the 
supplementary agreement. A supplementary agreement may allow for programs 
pursued with contributed funds, in more direct research cooperation (joint centres, for 
instance) or both. All Implementation Committees report annually to the Steering 
Committee/Policy Committee. Decisions are taken by consensus. 
3. A secretariat is established to organize meetings, prepare documents to committee 
meetings, administration of resources (receive and disburse money), receive requests 
for new memberships, communications, etc. If an alternative with several 
supplementary agreements is chosen, it may be necessary to establish an 
administrative unit for each of the supplementary agreements. 
 
Funding/cost sharing: A choice has to be made between voluntary contributions or mandatory 
assessed contributions. Mandatory contributions would be the preferred option, first of all 
because that would provide certainty for funding. A simple way of sharing costs could to 
agree on a specified percentage (0.1 %?) of GDP, possibly with a lower percentage for 
developing countries. Alternatively, one may apply the UN Assessment scale. One way may 
be to establish as a soft norm the 0.15% target (at least one third through monetary 
contributions). This may develop into a ‘harder norm’, or it may prove to work well as a soft 
norm, for instance in a context in which different countries do different things (flexible 
framework: as when Norway protects trees, Japan funds adaptation in the South).  
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Application for funding
 
 
: All entities in member countries may apply for project funding. The 
project funding to entities in member countries shall over any five-year period be no less than 
{50%} of the total contribution from that country during the same five-year period.  
 
Establishment of supplemental agreements for specific technological developments: 
Relationship between the framework agreement and supplemental agreements has to be 
elaborated. 
 
Signature 
An authorised representative of a Government should sign the treaty.  
 
Box 3: Elements of an Agreement on Climate and Energy Technology Development (ACT) 
 
i) Purpose: to stimulate the investment in and incentivizing of knowledge for far-reaching 
technological change while also ensuring dissemination of and affordable access to technology. 
 
ii) Relation to other agreements/instruments: ACT is supplemental to and mutually supportive 
with treaties/instruments for greenhouse gas emission reductions, such as the cap-and-trade 
arrangements of the Kyoto Protocol and Europe’s emission trading system (ETS). ACT 
addresses the need for investments in technologies providing future emission reductions. 
 
iii) Modes of operation: ACT shall allow drawing on several types of policy instruments to 
invest in and stimulate technological research and development, inter alia:  
• standards 
• procurement contracts 
• direct funding of research, including through prizes 
• public/private partnership; industry/university; South-South; North-South, etc 
• technology funds 
• coordination of individual country (and company) research, including 
instruments to expand access to and rapid and economical employment of technology 
 
iv) Governance and means of participation 
A governance structure with representation of participating countries is to be established, taking 
into account participation and contributions in different forms: 
 
A basic energy and climate technology fund (GECTF) has universal contributions of budgetary 
funds from members, and is governed directly by the ACT.  
 
ACT also establishes a basis for a family of member funds (MECTFs), through which member 
countries can attain partial credit for research and development not funded directly through ACT. 
MECTFs are recognized and credited under requirements established by ACT. An MECTF can 
be formed by one or several countries for more specific purposes. ACT`s concerns will relate to 
the global benefits of the research efforts, and concentrate on coordination, access and 
dissemination.  
 
ACT also establishes a basis for agreements along lines such as standards, procurement contracts 
etc, in which countries and other parties can participate;  
ACT is envisaged with a sunset clause, existing in a dynamic fashion until global participation in 
mitigation is seen as giving sufficient stimulus to energy and climate technology development 
and demonstration.  
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Entry into force 
The agreement enters into force immediately after signature. 
 
Withdrawal  
A member may not withdraw from the agreement before five years after its entry into force. 
After that period, a member may withdraw from the agreement with a 12 month notification 
to the Steering Committee. 
 
Relationship to UNFCCC 
The UNFCCC will be regularly informed about the activities under this agreement. This 
should preferably be under a separate agenda item of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA) at its regular sessions. In case it will not be possible to 
inform the Conference of the Parties or any of its subsidiary bodies, information may be 
provided through side events at the regular sessions of the UNFCCC. 
 
 
7 The way forward – How to gain broad international support 
for a technology agreement 
It is expected that gaining international support for an agreement on technology development 
and demonstration may require significant efforts. Some are already planned, e.g. the Club de 
Madrid/Hafslund/Bellona meeting taking place in Norway in early June 2008, and a side 
event at the SBSTA/SBI negotiations in Bonn, Germany, later the same month. A possible 
scenario for further actions to achieve eventual agreement may be to follow the sequence set 
out below: 
1. The Norwegian government will have to consider the proposal to launch the idea of a 
technology agreement internationally and a decision must include economic support 
to the initiative. A Norwegian grant to the initiative could be 0.1 % of GDP per year. 
With a GDP of 150,000 million Euros, the Norwegian contribution would be 150 
million Euros or 1.2 billion NOK per year. In addition, Norway may consider 
offering to take responsibility for secretariat functions for an initial period.  
2. After a decision by the Norwegian government, support should be sought from a few 
like-minded countries. As early as possible, perhaps even before the Norwegian grant 
is formally decided, the initiative should be presented informally to the Nordic 
countries and key EU members like Netherland, Germany, France and United 
Kingdom and perhaps Saudi Arabia, China, India or South Africa.  
3. If positive support is received through the first informal contacts mentioned above, 
the initiative should be presented to the UNFCCC. The most appropriate forum to 
launch the initiative would be the group working on strengthening the long-term 
cooperation under the Convention (AWGLCA).  
4. Like-minded countries should be invited to negotiations on the agreement, based on a 
draft text developed by Norway. 
5. The agreement could be signed at a ministerial conference organised by Norway. This 
could either be at a separate conference in mid-2009, or in connection with the 
climate conference in Copenhagen in December 2009. 
6. It is essential that a proposal on an agreement on technology development will be 
perceived as supporting a post-2012 agreement under the UNFCCC on strengthened 
emission reductions, and not as an alternative to a UNFCCC instrument. The idea of 
an additional agreement on technology agreement should therefore be introduced as 
early as possible in the negotiations, and efforts should be made to include text in a 
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post-2012 agreement that allows recognition of supporting agreements and opens for 
cooperation and interaction. 
 
“Selling” the idea of a new international agreement on development and demonstration of 
climate friendly technology will require significant efforts from Norwegian authorities, at 
both the political and administrative level. It will be particularly important to get support from 
a core group of likeminded countries (see point 2 above). The most effective way of 
achieving this might be make this a core theme in bilateral meetings between ministers. See 
also Box 4 below. 
 
 
 
8 Box 4: Possible Norwegian initiatives: A Member Fund, as an illustrative example: 
 
Norway has itself started energy technology development and demonstration efforts, most 
prominently in the field of carbon capture and storage, and is prepared to channel these efforts into 
a climate and energy technology fund (MECTF).  
 
Norway’s aim should be to equip this fund not only with its existing investments in this area, but to 
raise these investments to a level of z billion Euros over the coming 10-15 years, with the intention 
of expanding it further; 
 
Norway’s aim should be to allow this fund to be open for international cooperation in one or two 
ways:  
• Norway should invite other countries to participate in the fund, and to reformulate mandate 
and governance structure accordingly (a ‘Nordic Energy and Climate Technology Fund 
(NECTF)’, or a ‘Fossil Fuel Exporter’s Energy and Climate Technology Fund’ may be the 
first developments) 
• Norway should be prepared to ‘submit’ its fund into a family of funds supported by (and to 
some extent governed by) a Global Energy and Climate Technology Fund (GECTF).  
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